



19 August 1981 
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 
CEPAL 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
Shipping Resources in Developing 
Countries: Opportunity for Growth 
fourth International Shipping Conference, 
organized by the International Chamber 
of Commerce 
Caracas, Venezuela, 8-10 September 1981 
A COST-CENTER APPROACH TO LINER CONFERENCE FREIGHT RATES 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
	




I. THE OCEAN TRANSPOR:2 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ............. 	3 
II. LINER CONFERENCE FREIGHT RATE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES 
III. SHIPPERS' COUNCILS 	 — 	 10 
IV. THE IMPACT OF NON-CONFERENCE CARRIERS AND 
OMER INDEPENDENT GROUPS ON FREIGHT RATES ............ 
V. THE DIVISION OF LINER FREIGHT RATES INTO THREE 
NATURAL COST CENTERS ..........................,...... 
	18 
VI. PROBABLE EFFECTS CF APPLYING A COST-CENTER 
OCEAN LINER TARIFF ................................... 	22 
1. A cost-center ocean tariff which maintains 
unchanged all existing rates ..................... 	22 
2. A cost-center ocean tariff which reflects 
cost variations among ports served .....,......... 	25 
3. A cost-center ocean tariff which reduces 
rate discrimination among commodities ............ 	28 








As a result of the hir:h percentage of fixed costs in ocean trans-
port and physical capital of considerable longevity, shipping lines over 
a century ago. began forming associations or conferences to establish 
minimum. freight rates and rationalize the offer of transport services to 
assure an acceptable rate of return on investment. In the establishment 
of ocean freight rates, conferences have developed practices which 
aggregate costs such as loading, discharge and transport as well as aver,- 
aging those for port and vessel operation. 
The aggregation and averaging practices utilized by conferences for 
the establishment of freight rates have brought about much adverse com-
ment from shippers and their representatives, and have created an oppor-
tunity for efficient non-conference carriers to obtain important market_ 
shares. Moreover, many, governmental and international organizations have 
indicated a growing reluctance to allow liner conferences to retain their 
traditional freedom in the unilateral establishment of ocean freight rates. 
In an effort to permit those persons involved in the ocean trans- 
port of goods to identify 	control costs over which they have respon- 
sibility, the OEPAI, secretariat proposes a partial disaggregation of 
ocean freight rates into three natural cost centers -i.e., those costs 
incurred at the port of embarkation, those at the port of destination 
and those for the transport o goods between such ports- without any 
change in legal relationships. The division of existing ocean freight 
rates into these three natural cost centers would not only permit a great-
er degree of control over individual cost elements but also create an 
information producing system for the use of shippers and carriers alike. 
• 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since exports, imports and economic growth are clearly interrelated, 
transport has a strategic role in the development processes of all coun-
tries. However, due to Latin America's geography, the composition of its 
trade and the location of its foreign markets, there are few if any alter-
natives to maritime transport for much of its international trade. As 
maritime transport accounts for over 90ii; of all Latin American` exports, 
shippers and their representatives, export promotion committees and minis-
tries of transport have become deeply concerned over continued increases 
in ocean freight rates. This concern emphasizes that, with growing spe-
cialization as a principal means to achieve national economic goals, ef-
ficient low-cost maritime transport is a necessity. To avoid the risk 
that freight rate increases will make Latin American exports as well as 
those of other countries uncompetitive in - foreign markets, it is necessary 
to investigate alternative freight rate structures which identify indivi-
dual cost components and permit their control by appropriate persons in 
the transport chain. 
Ocean transport is a highly capital-intensive industry which employs 
physical capital of considerable longevity. For example, while the inter-
national road transport industry has found that trucks have an average 
economic life from three to five years, the average economic life of a 
vessel is approximately 20 years. In circumstances such as these, a deci-
sion to purchase a new vessel is particularly influenced by the rate of 
return on capital and methods which may be utilized to insure such return. 
One method employed by shipowners to assure an acceptable rate of return 
is through the formation of associations or conferences among all shipping 
lines serving a particular trade. 
Ocean liner conferences can be traced back to 1868, when represent-
atives of five shipping lines which had been competing with each other for 
the lucrative North Atlantic cargo and passenger traffic met at Liverpool, 
England, to discuss a uniform freight rate structure that could benefit 
each company and eliminate rate reductions to attract business.1J As a 
/ Via Port of New York - New Jerse , October 1980, p. 4. 
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result of this meeting, a listing of minimum ocean freight rates for the 
transport of cargo and passengers was adopted. Due to the success of this 
liner conference in terminating harmful rate competition, assuring an ac-
ceptable rate of:return on invested capital and providing a regular offer 
of ocean transport services, similar conferences were established in other 
trades until today they are utilized for all ocean transport services 
except those for the carriage of merchandise in bulk. 
Conferences have subsequently evolved numerous means other than 
minimum freight rates and rationalized schedules to assure an acceptable 
rate of return, such as common pricing, rebating, presenting aggregated 
and averaged liner freight rates, and a substantial amount of cargo and 
revenue sharing among members. The most important consideration from the 
viewpoint of economic development, however, continues to be freight rates. 
This document thus seeks to analyze: 
(a) the ocean transport economic environment which gave rise to and, 
as yet, supports liner conference freight rate activities; 
(b) liner conference freight rate structure and practices; 
(c) shippers' councils and their freight rate activities; 
(d) the impact of non-conference carriers and other independent 
groups on liner freight rate activities, and 
(e) the division of liner conference freight rates into three 
natural cost centers. 
I. THE OCEAN TRANSPORT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
To understand why ocean transport gave rise to conferences a brief 
review of the economic environment in which merchant vessels operate would 
appear useful. Since shipping lines offer large, indivisible cargo carry-
ing units, i.e., the 'holds" of vessels, they have an inherent inflexibil-
ity for cargo capacity. That is, if there is not enough cargo to fill all 
holds, they must nevertheless be transported. As a result, upon setting 
a sailing date, almost all expenses which were variable become fixed and, 
consequently, the competition between shipping lines to obtain sargo to 
fill their vessels at any price is tremendous. 
/A major 
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A major reason underlying the establishment of ocean liner confer-
ences originally was the stabilization of freight rates. Without the 
conference mechanism, history shows that uneconomic rate reductions break 
out to attract more cargo and the weaker lines are either forced to close 
or absorbed by the stronger lines. Since the survivors have little or no 
competition, rates are raised until such time as new carriers are attracted 
to the trade and the cycle of rate reductions commences once again. 
Conferences seek to deter this cycle from occurring, thereby bringing a 
certain stability to ocean freight rates. 
When conferences were initially formed, cargoes moved strictly via 
breakbulk vessels. More recently, within the last 20 years, new types of 
vessels have been introduced into the shipping industry -cellular contain-
er, R0-RO and LASH vessels. These types of vessels have changed the whole 
concept of not only the shipping but also the transport industry. That is, 
they have permitted the creation of a transpOrt system in which cargo can 
be loaded into transport units, e.g., containers, at the shipper's place 
of business and moved all the way to the consignee, utilizing various 
means of transport, without being removed from such units in route. 
The unit load concept has introduced a situation in which shippers 
are now dealing with a through-transport operator who could be either 
a haulier, a forwarding agent, a shipping company, or an entirely new 
company established purely for this purpose -a multimodal transport oper-
ator (MTO). While shippers of this region have only recently began to 
transport goods in containers and have made only limited use of containers 
on a through-transport basis, shippers of other regions utilizing contain-
ers on that basis have encountered freight rate difficulties similar to 
those with liner conferences. According to Mr. D. Standen, chairman of 
the British Shippers' Council Sea Transport Committee and the European 
Shippers' Council Liner Committee, through-transport operators have gener-
ally refused to supply shippers with a breakdown of their single through 
rate into its component parts and often try to pass on percentage increases 
in the sea fieight element as percentages on the total through rate without 
revealing rebates and discounts received from shipping lines.2/ 
2/ Seatrade, December 1978, p. 29. 
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It is interesting to note that during the Intergovernmental Prepara-
tory Group discussions concerning the United Nations Convention on Inter-
national Multimodal Transport of Goods, the developing countries unsuccess-
fully sought to have included certain public law clauses which would 
require through or multimodal transport operators to quote rates in such 
a manner that shippers could identify separately the charges levied in 
respect of each movement by different means of transport.2/ Thus, while 
a cost center approach to liner freight rates was specifically elaborated 
for general cargo liners, it would nonetheless provide important insights 
into the solution of freight rate problems created by the through-transport 
concept. 
. LINER CONFERENCE FREIGHT RATE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES 
As ocean transport costs significantly affect the competitive posi-
tion of Latin American goods in world markets, countries of this region 
are vitally concerned with freight rates and the terms under which their 
exports and imports are transported. It should be understood that Latin 
American producers wish to sell more primary products and manufactured 
goods internationally and shipping lines .want to transport such merchan-
dise. If this common goal Is to be achieved, then transport costs must 
be as low as possible in order that the goods will be competitive in 
foreign markets. 
The term "rate structure" means the whole set of factors taken into 
account by liner conferences for the establishment of freight rates. While 
there have been numerous attempts to catalogue these factors, the list 
prepared for the Inter-American Maritime Conference (1941) 1  is one of 
the most exhaustive that has been drawn up, identifying twenty-seven 
factors: 
.2/ UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental PruratoryGroup  on a Conven-
tion on International Multimodal Transport on its Fourth Session (TD/B/ 
682), 2L.  January 1978, paragraph 19. 
Inter-American Maritime Conference, Report of relegates ofthe United 
States (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 25-28. Quoted 
in Robert T. Brown, Transport and the Economic Integration of South America 
(The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 117. 
/1. Character 
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1. Character of the cargo; 
2. Volume of cargo; 
3. Availability of cargo; 
4. Susceptibility to damage; 
5. Susceptibility to pilferage; 
6. Value of goods; 
7. Packing; 
8. Stowage; 
9. Relationship of weight to measure; 
10. Heavy lifts; 
11. Extra lengths; 
12. Competition with goods, from.other sources of supply; 
13. Cargo via competitive gateways; 
14. Competition from other carriers; 
15. Direct cost of operation; 
16. Distance; 
17. Canal tolls; 
18. Port location; 
19. Possibility of securing return cargoes; 
20. Cost of handling; 
21. Lighterage; 
22. Special deliveries or services; 
23. Port facilities; 
24. Port regulations; 
25. Port charges and dues; 
26. Fixed charges, and 
27. Insurance. 
In an earlier study of Latin American freight rates,// it was deter-
mined that two of these factors -the value of the commodity carried and 
the stowage factor- account almost entirely for the differences between 
freight rates per ton for various commodities. The value of the commodity 
2/ CEPAL, Maritime Fret Rates in the Foreign Trade of Latin America 
(E/CN.12/812/Rev.1), 24 r. ovember 1970, p. 108. 
/carried may 
carried may be regarded as reflecting the conditions of demand for the 
product and, hence, shipping services, while the stowage factor reflects 
the conditions governing the cost of transport.. 
All conference members charge the same. amount for carriage of a given 
product between one port or any port in a range of ports in the origin 
area and a particular port or any port in the range in the destination 
area. Ocean liner tariff schedules giye a specific rate for the carriage 
of most items of general cargo between the.two areas, although products 
not frequently traded are covered by the application of a "not otherwise 
specified' rate (n.o.s.). When an n.o.s. item becomes sufficiently .import-
ant to warrant separate treatment, a specific rate is -agreed for it. . Some 
products are excluded from the schedule, these being primarily bulk items 
for which the individual member lines are allowed to charge what they may 
think fit (open rate) so as to fill any empty space by capturing a market 
segment that would otherwise be serviced by tramp.vessels. 
Under, the rate setting procedures used by conferences, the cost of 
providing transport services haslittle influence. on the rates charged. 
Rather, those products with the highest, ratio of value-to-weight are 
generally assigned the highest rates in the schedule, in the belief that 
demand for theseproducts -and hence. demandfor maritime transport- is 
relatively inelastic with respect to changesin freight rates. This is 
an example. of 'charging what the traffic will bear'. Another important 
reason why the rates for particular products may be quite,unrelated to the 
costs of transport services is that, as time passes, rates are subject to 
periodic adjustments of a blanket naturp,as costs rise in general. Thus, 
even if there had originally been a cost-based rationale for certain rates, 
successive general rate increases would tend to diminish such rationality. 
Moreover, seldom are rates for particular products modified to reflect 
changed market conditions,and there may be a time lag between the change 
in conditions and. the• adjustment of the rate so_that the relation between 
any one rate and market conditions could also be weak. 
Not only at the product level does the conference tariff tend to 
have a weak relationship with the costs of carriage. There also existsa 
less-than-perfect correspondence between costs and prices-on the spatial 
/plane. Mainly 
8 
plane. Mainly on the grounds of simplicity, conferences frequently set 
the same rates from any one Of a range of ports in the origin area of the 
cargo to any one of a range of ports in the destination area. Thus, the 
fact that one port may be much cheaper to use than another is usually not 
reflected in lower rates. Sometimes a port is allocated to a different 
range on the grounds of different cost conditions, but usually the only 
way that cost variations are recognized is by the application of a sur-
charge to a port that is suffering from congestion.6/ 
The tariff listings vary considerably in length, depending on the 
number of different ranges identified, the number of products traded 
frequently enough to warrant individual treatment, and the extent to which 
obsolete nomenclatures are maintained. The tariff book also contains a 
section explaining the conditions under which goods are accepted for trans-
port. Included as well are a list of member lines, any general rate 
increases since the schedule was drawn up, congestion surcharges, bunker 
and currency adjustment factors, definitions of" relevant terms such as 
what is meant, by samples which may be carried free of charge, any extra 
charges that may apply to goods shipped in heavy or voluminous packages, 
exceptional dimensions, conditions of payment, etc. 
The individual tariff schedule rates are established so that the 
most inefficient line belonging to the conference can earn enough not only 
to cover its operating costs but also sufficient profit to assure a reason-
able rate of return on invested capital. The difference in operating 
costs for members of a liner conference is best illustrated in a trade 
for which comprehensive information was made available to UNCTAD by five 
shipping lines. It was found from an analysis of this information that 
the annual cost of the highest cost vessel was 132')i) higher than that of 
the lowest cost vessel.?/ Therefore, freight rates established by a liner 
conference which provide the highest cost operator a reasonable rate of 
return on invested capital to assure vessel replacement at the end of its 
W See, for example, United States Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 
205. 
27 UNCTAD, Freight Rates (ID/B/c.4/128), 3 September 1975, paragraph 13. 
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economic life would permit the lowest cost operator to "earn" 132% more 
than necessary for such replacement. 
Since shipping lines combine to set freight rates, they-can charge 
rates that on the whole are higher than would be possible if the lines 
actively competed in such trades. Moreover, the conference lines are under 
less incentive to keep their costs low and their operations efficient.1/ 
Liner conferences indicate that their members compete with each other, 
not on the basis' of who can offer the lowest freight rate, but who can 
best provide the service requirements that shippers might need.2/ Nonethe-
less, service competition does not appear to be an adequate means by which 
the cost components of a singular freight rate might be identified and 
controlled. 
The freight rates for ocean liner conferences have grown into a 
jungle of complex calculations, surcharges and conditione.10/ In a special-
ized transport magazine, Mr. J.F. Muheith, Chairman of the' Standing Commit-
tee of the European Shippers' Councils, stated that, "Conferences must 
reform tariffs and simplify rules and conditions so that shipowners, their 
agents and shippers need less administration, and consequently can operate 
and sell cheaper".11/ Similarly, according to Mr. H.R. Graf, president of 
Cast North America Ltd., a successful nen-conference ocean carrier on the 
highly competitive North Atlantic, "The commodity tariff is closely linked 
with the conference structure, which is a struCture'conoeived 'in the 19th 
century. ... We believe that's antiquated -thinking which doesn't lend 
itself to today's needs. ... It takes at least six months to train some-
body to read today's commodity tariff, thousands of pages of it. . 
There's a lot of administrative staff involved in it". 12/ 
The structure of liner conference freight rates has been the subject 
of much adverse comment,being described at various times as unnecessarily 
complex, resulting in freight rates altogether too high and reflecting 
8/ UNCTAD, Consultation Eachl_LILL (TD/B/C.4/127/Supp, ), 23 April 1975. 
9/ Transport 2000, May/June 1979, p. 14. 
lc/ 2.212121_t2000, January/:February 1980, p. 14. 
12 ibid. 
11/ Transport 2000, January/February 1981, p. 14. 
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a monopoly position, as well as being surrounded by a veil of secrecy. 
Whether a conference is a wicked cartel of greedy shipowners or•a. sensible 
organization avoiding wasteful competition, depends on-whether you are a 
user or seller of maritime transport 'services. . Nonetheless, the theory 
that transport costs are only a marginal element of the final sales price 
must be abandoned by shipping- lines and their conferences.121 Instead of 
clinging to such an outdated economic concept, shipping lines, container 
operators - and conferences should join forces in the elaboration of a 
freight rate structure which can permit those involved in international 
cargo movements to recognize individual cost.elements and take appropriate 
measures for their control.• 
III. SHIPPERS' COUNCILS 
It should be understood from the outset that shippers and their 
councils neither. oppose the continued. existence of the conference system 
nor advocate the total utilization of independent steamship operators. 
Shippers point out that if a liner conference refuses a freight rate 
proposal, such rate is normally accepted by a non-conference carrier. 
When this occurs, liner conferences lower their freight rates to solicit 
cargo which a short time ago was considered unremunerative and not worthy 
of rate relief. 1L/ For this reason shippers seek to protect independent 
carriers, despite conference rate reductions. 
While shippers are not against the conference system per se and 
there seems to be a recognition that conferences can be in their interest, 
doubt exists that this is the case in all situations. Considering shipper 
criticism of existing conference rate practices,. it perhaps seems sur-
prising that they continue to patronize conference services. However, 
there is still widespread support for the conference system and the 
criticism arises from a frustration that an otherwise mutually beneficial 
22/ Geraci, :Vincent J., and. Wilfried Frewo, 'Bilateral Trade Flows and 
Transport Costs", The Review of Economics and Statistics', Vol. 59, 
Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 67-74• 
14/  Container News, December. 1980, p. 14. 
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relationship is believed to be weighted in favor of only one party -the 
shipowner. For example, the New Zealand Meat and Dairy Boards recently 
announced that they would continue to assign cargoes to existing confer-
ence carriers even though the decision will mean that shippers have to 
meet higher freight rates than were on offer from a non-conference carrier. 
The major factor which influenced this decision was a conference capacity 
to provide a "totally integrated service which can be programmed with some 
precision" to carry produce when desired to reach North American markets 
at the most advantageous times.12/ 
With the proliferation of general rate increases, currency and 
bunker surcharges, certain shippers feel that unity in the form of 
shippers' councils is a far better way to address these questions than 
on an individual basis. As freight rates are established by conferences 
using some or all of the twenty-seven aforementioned factors, any compar-
ison of freight rates to determine if rate discrimination exists should 
be made for similar products transported on the same route -i.e., either 
inbound or outbound. Nonetheless, a comparison of inbound with outbound 
rates can provide useful insights into, inter alia, the effectiveness of 
shippers' councils. For example, the existence of shippers' councils 
in Europe and the Far East but not in the U.S. has resulted in a situation 
where ocean liner freight rates are 32.2% higher for U.S. exports than for 
similar imported commodities on the same routes. Further, the difference 
in rates paid by exporters from the U.S. and those charged to third 
country shippers to the same markets average 100% and run as high as 302% 
for outbound cargoes from Japan.16/ 
Liner conference members serving the trade from the North American 
continent to Australia and New Zealand have encountered a growing ship-
pers' resistance to prevailing freight rate levels. Canadian shippers 
indicate that it is cheaper to route goods via Hong Kong or Japan for 
final delivery in Australia or New Zealand than to ship directly with 
conference carriers from Canadian East and West Coast ports. Mr. James 
12/ Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 27 November 1980,  p. 7. 
16/ Seatrade, September 1978, p. 37. 
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Moore, Secretary of both the Canadian Export Association and the Canadian 
Shippers' Council, expressed frustration with conference intransigence 
over revealing their cost structures to support such high rates.17/ 
However, in response to pressure from the Federation of ASEAN Shippers' 
Councils (FASC), concerning the method by which freight rate increases 
are calculated, the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) indicated that 
it now intends to substantiate all freight increases with outside data, 
e.g., from the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, rather than from intra-conference 
sources.18/ While the practice would seem laudable, its success largely 
depends upon the relevance of the data selected. 
For some time shippers on many conference routes have been pressing 
strongly for a more simplified freight rate structure. For example, 
the FASC has long been critical of the tariff structure of the FEFC and 
has been seeking individual government support for legislation designed 
to give greater local control over the setting of freight rates by the 
FEFC.22/ The desired legislation would require west-bound conference rates 
to be determined in negotiation with the national shippers' councils. 
It is interesting to note that liner conferences are as subject 
to international control as is any other commercial area. For instance, 
in an effort to recover revenues lost in a longshoremen's strike that 
idled East and Gulf Coast ports of the U.S.A. during 1978, various North 
Atlantic conferences sought to impose a freight rate surcharge. Nonethe-
less, this surcharge was cancelled due to protests of shippers on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the European National Shippers' Council and the 
U.S. Federal Maritime Commission.22/ Moreover, such control can be imple-
mented effectively by regional, rather than by worldwide agreements, and ' 
in some cases by single countries. There is little to prevent an econom-
ically strong regional group of countries, such as those of the FASC, 
from establishing their own regulations for conferences.21/ 
17/ Fairplazkterr)ationa ieelcly, 14 May 1981, p. 12. 
E./ fairElaxInternational Shipping Weekly, 22 February 1979, p. 6. 
ILtiz ialshij-nalza, 28 June 1979, p. 6. 
22/ Fair la International Shi in Weekl , 13 July 1978, p. 55; and 
Seatrade, March 197:, p. 2:. 
21.7 Paul Burke (John Hopkins University), Issues in qLELLEELLFuture: Need 
for and Pros•ects of Liner Conferences, Intereconomics, January 19777--  
p. 27. 	 /While most 
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While most Latin American countries have shippers' councils, some 
of the more active are those of Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Mexico. The co-operation among otherwise autonomous national shippers' 
councils in the Latin American region was formalized in 1979 with the 
• 	establishment of the Federation of Latin American International Transport 
Users Councils (FELACUTI). FELACUTI seeks not only to present regional 
needs at the international level but also to strengthen regional negotia-
tions with conferences.22/ An example of the co-operation that can exist 
between shippers and liner conferences is the Joint European Shippers' 
Council/Council of European and Japanese Shipowners'Associatione. This 
association has elaborated a code on which relations between shippers and 
liner conferences are based, and provides shippers an opportunity to 
participate in the establishment of liner freight rates. 
Up to the early 1950s, liner shipping tended to be the domain of 
the fleets of the long-established maritime nations. Nonetheless, during 
the last two decades developing nations began to seek an increased share 
of their own countries' trade. In recognition of these legitimate ambi-
tions the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
undertook in 1971 the elaboration of what would later become known as the 
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences .22/ This Code, 
adopted in April 1974, outlines as its fundamental objectives the develop-
ment of regular and efficient liner services, a balancing of interests 
between suppliers and users of these services, and the holding of meaning-
ful consultations between conferences and such users. To develop efficient 
liner services, balance the interests of users and suppliers of shipping 
services, and hold meaningful consultations, there must be an interchange 
of relevant cost and revenue data between shippers and conferences to 
justify requests by the latter for changes in rates. For example, the 
objectives and principles of the Code provide: 
22/ CEPAL, Boletin FAL, Na 25, December 1979. 
23/ UNCTAD, Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (TD/ 
CODE/13/Add.1), 1975. 
/"conferences should  
"conferences should make available to interested parties 
pertinent information about their activities which are 
relevant to those parties and should publish meaningful  
information of their activities" (emphasis added). 
Without such information, an agreement that freight rates have been estab-
lished at a level which permits only a "reasonable profit for shipowners" 
and the holding of "mutually constructive consultations" -Articles 12 and 
11 respectively- would be impossible. 
As the economic circumstances which gave rise to liner conferences 
still exist, there is little doubt that the conference system will survive. 
Nonetheless, due to growing shipper discontent, sophistication and polit-
ical power such survival is clearly based upon a recognition by the con-
ferences that, after more than a century of dominating ocean transport, 
the structure and unilateral practice for establishment of freight rates 
must change. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF NON-CONFERENCE CARRIERS AND OTHER INDEPENDENT 
GROUPS ON FREIGHT RATES 
Historically, non-conference carriers were small entrepreneurs who 
took a largely insignificant part of a trade for short periods, never 
providing a real or long-term threat to conference domination. As soon as 
the non-conference carrier was established, it adopted a freight tariff 
very similar to that of the conference with rates 10% or so lower to 
attract cargo. There are several trades in which reputable non-conference 
carriers have gained tacit acceptance by a conference so long as rates 
maintain this differential. However, since the advent of containerization 
there appears to be a growing trend towards the emergence of highly ef-
ficient, large-scale non-conference carriers that have considerable expe-
rience and financial stability, are prepared to make a long-term commit-
ment to a trade and are able to offer rates lower than those of the con-
ference carriers while maintaining comparable services. The effect of 
these new non-conference carriers on the overall conference freight rate 
structure has been significant. Perhaps the conferences most affected by 
such independent carriers would be the Far Eastern Freight Conference 
(FEFC), the New Zealand European Shipping Association and the Trans-
Atlantic Associated Freight Conference. 
/The FEFC 
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The FEFC member lines not only face competition from independent 
carriers such as the Trans-Siberian railway (TSR) and Evergreen Line but 
also increased transport capacities from existing and new conference mem-
bers. The TSR service has been progressively improved until its efficiency 
and reliability make it an extremely attractive carrier, especially for 
smaller parcels with narrow price margins .24/ Despite the TSR, greatest 
concern within the FEFC involves the activities of the non-conference 
carriers such as Evergreen, which entered the trade during mid-1979. Since 
that time it has maintained an impressive growth record and recently ac-
quired a number of major shippers such as Ford. As a result of the freight 
rate competition brought about by independent carriers such as the TSR and 
Evergreen, the FEFC in early 1980 began offering drastically reduced rates 
on certain commodities .251 It is interesting to note that in a recent sur-
vey of Japanese shippers, the FEFC was found to have a "lack of positive 
interest" in their suggestions.26/ Perhaps a positive interest in shipper 
suggestions could have improved conference services and averted such rate 
reductions. 
As a result of benign governmental legislation, unquestioned shipper 
acceptance and persuasive marketing, the conference system has enjoyed a 
quasi-monopoly position in the Australia/New Zealand trades since the 
colonial period.22/ Nonetheless, for the first time there is a financially 
strong and viable non-conference carrier alternative -ABC Containerline-
on the trade between Australia/New Zealand and Europe. ABC originally 
began transporting Australian minerals to various European and North Amer-
ican markets, and turned to containers as not only a remunerative outbound 
load but also a cargo unit compatible with its bulk fleet configuration. 
As ABC offers freight rates from 10% to 15% below those currently , charged 
by members of the New Zealand European Shipping Association ,28/ it pro-
vides a useful insight into the savings which shippers could enjoy if 
24/ Fairplay.1 . 	International Shi..i 	Week1/, 17 January 1980, p. 41. 
Fairplay International Shipping Wee 	6 March 1980, p. 8. 
26/ Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 13 March 1980, p. 9. 
27/ Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 2 October 1980, p. 19. 
281 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 2 April 1981, p. 6. 
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conference carriers were truly efficient and economic. Reflecting the 
presence of ABC, the New Zealand Wool Board gave the Association its stat-
utory two-year notice that the current long-standing freight agreement will 
be terminated in its present form beginning October 1982. Moreover, the 
Australian Wool Buyers have taken advantage of this situation and negotiat-
ed a highly favorable three-year freight agreement with the conference.12/ 
While the Trans-Atlantic Associated Freight Conference 22/ was origin-
ally established in the North Atlantic trade to bring about freight rate 
stability and rationalize sailings, the current situation in this trade 
brings the conference role and its capacity to achieve these goals into 
question. Following the 1973 grain sale by the U.S.A. to Russia, vessels 
of the latter country were permitted to load and discharge cargoes at 
U.S.A. East Coast ports. Thereafter, these fleets continued trading as 
non-conference carriers on the North Atlantic ,12/ quoting freight rates 
from 15%0 to 30% below those offered by conference members ..22/ It is inter-
esting to note that, while Russian vessels have left this trade, the 
freight rates quoted by conference lines are now lower than those of the 
Russian fleet. Similarly, Cast North America Limited is a non-conference 
carrier operating a container service on the North Atlantic between 
Montreal, Canada, and Antwerp, Belgium. It should be noted that Cast has 
combined a two-port service with very slow vessel speeds of 14 knots and 
an efficient inland distribution system at both ends of the trade to reduce 
overall, i.e., origin to destination transport times. The line bases its 
freight rates on the cost to move containers the distance required plus a 
profit margin.lY The type of cargo in the container, its weight, volume 
and value are immaterial, except for purposes of documentation, customs, 
22/ L12:2122 International  Shipping Weekly, 25 September 1980, p. 9. 
2221.1.112/If°1123 22LIEIII.2211-2, 2 October 1980, p. 9. 
.22/ Included in this Association are the North Atlantic Baltic Freight 
Conference; North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference; North Atlantic 
French Atlantic Freight Conference; and the North Atlantic United Kingdom 
Freight Conference. See footnote /.  
Transport 2000, March/April 1977, p. 10. 
Transport 2000, September/October 1978, p. 36. 
.2LE/ Transport 2000, January/February 1981, p. 
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insurance and safety. According to Cast president, Mr. H.R. Graf, freight 
rate instability on the North Atlantic is not due to the independent car-
riers but rather to the conference structure and its inflexibility.2.2/ 
While non-conference carriers have had a significant impact on the 
liner freight rate structure, governmental groups as well as conference 
members have also brought the current rate structure into question. 
Following the New Zealand government's initiative 26/ to study liner 
freight rates in its outbound trades and in an effort to review conference 
practices for establishment of those rates, it was determined that during 
the last decade while the consumer price index had risen by 182A and farm 
input prices by 175%, the cost of shipping wool to Europe had increased by 
265%, butter by 349% and lamb carcasses by 431%.22/ The Deputy Director of 
Lincoln College's agriculture economic research unit, Dr. P. Chudleigh, 
indicated that from this data "one could conclude that the new (maritime 
transport) technologies adopted in the 1970's have been inappropriate or 
have been introduced inefficiently or that the lines have not been passing 
on savings due to the container revolution".26/ 
As a•.result of freight rate competition in the trans-Pacific trades, 
during March 1980 Sea-Land Services Inc. withdrew from nine eastbound con-
ferences. Sea-Land indicated that it would consider revoking this decision 
if conferences would permit independent rate making among members to 
counter such competition. While the conferences did not agree to this 
proposal, they immediately lowered freight rates by an average of 9%..L/ 
Nonethelegs, one year later Sea-Land was considering re-entry into these 
conferences as a new rating formula which would permit a limited degree of 
individual rate setting was under study.E2/ 
A booklet published by the Associated Latin American Freight Confer-
ences indicates teat, "Conferences have very little latitude, very little 
room to maneuver, when it comes to fixing charges (freight rates). Most 
22/ Ibid. 
26/ Fairplay International  Shipping Weekly, 18/25 December 1980, p. 9. 
2 2:21r1122"..jaternational Shipping Weekly, 1 January 1981, p. 9. 
26/ Ibid. 
22/ Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 27 March 1980, p.  9. 
Faj-r:ELIYL1teraa:t4n9.1.Shij ., 2 April 1981, p. 7. 
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developing countries, in that they are unable to exercise anytcontrol over 
loading, discharging and ship operating costs because they are unable to 
identify the individual factors involved. 
There are a few instances in which conference members do not trade 
under normal liner terms. Sometimes the loading operation is performed 
for the account of an entity other than the line; sometimes the unloading 
is the responsibility of a third party, either the importer or the export-
er, depending on the terms of the contract of sale. When both loading and 
unloading are performed under the responsibility of a party other than the 
shipping line, the terms of shipment are known as "free-in-and-out", 
(f.i.o.). Sometimes the shipment may be either "free-in" or "free-out", 
discharge-free being an alternative expression for free-out. Carriage 
under any one of these terms is common in the case of trip charters for 
bulk products and has been tending to become more frequent in the liner 
trades since the latter half of the 1960s. In exceptional circumstances, 
a conference line may quote a rate f.i.o. so as to compete with a tramper 
vessel which offers such terms to a shipper who may prefer them. 'Also, a 
few conferences have come to adopt either "free-in" or "free-out" rates 
as a standard practice. Examples are conferences that involve the socialist 
bloc and those on certain trades in the Mediterranean, where a prime mover 
in the change from the traditional liner terms was an attempt on the part 
of the lines to separate their rates from rapidly escalating cargo handl-
ing costs outside their control. 
The f.i.o. concept was adopted as a means by which the lintes could 
avoid the need to increase their tariffs when faced by rises in handling 
costs, particularly in developed countries, over which they have little 
influence. However, as the introduction of f.i.o. terms means that the 
traditional division of responsibility between shipper wadi shipping line 
as defined by liner terms is upset, there are difficulties of an institu-
tional nature which impede their introduction on a general scale. 
While the present division of responsibility between carriers and 
persons providing cargo handling services is codified, litigates and well 
ry 
understood, the alternative by which each shippev-would contract separately 
for carriage and cargo handling services would cAnge this well understood 
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practice, creating unknown areas of liability and a mass of uncoordinated 
negotiations between shippers and suppliers of cargo handling services. 
Furthermore, in the context of the liner trades especially, a complication 
in the use of f.i.o. rates is the need to have available not only the 
tariff book of the carrier but also tariff information for the ports of 
loading and unloading, which still would often not permit a shipper to 
know in advance what his real cost will be.1 1/ 
It is one of the characteristics of a cost-center approach to ocean 
liner tariffs that the separation between port costs and vessel operating 
costs is similar to that under f.i.o. terms, but without any change in the 
allocation of responsibility as defined by liner terms, nor would the 
potential user of liner services have to be separately aware of port-related 
charges from sources other than the liner tariff. Basically, the division 
of liner freight rates into three natural cost centers is a means of pre-
senting the rates of a liner conference in such a way that the total charge 
under liner terms is divided up into three separately stated elements. 
The first of these elements refers to the costs of loading the cargo at 
the port of origin, the second corresponds to the linehaul movements bet-
ween the ports of origin and destination, and the third refers to the dis-
charge costs at the port of destination. Physically, the current manner 
of presenting the rates in the liner conferences tariff would.be:maintain-
ed, but instead of there being a single column of rates alongside the iden-.. 
tification of commodities, there would appear three columns plus a total. 
While the concept of a cost-center ocean liner tariff is exceedingly 
simple, there are two entirely different ways in which it,cah be defined 
for practical application. Both alternatives share the following common 
characteristics: the first column, corresponding to costs in the port of 
origin, includes direct cargo handling costs plus port dues and charges; 
the second column includes all ship's costs while navigating from the port 
of origin to the port of destination; and the third column includes direct 
cargo handling costs plus port dues and charges in the port of destination. 
The difference between the two alternatives lies in the treatment of the 
42/ For further discussion of the f.i.o. concept see UNCTAD, Freight Rates, 
TD/B/C.4/135), 4 September 1975. 
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ship's operating costs while in the ports of origin and destination. Under 
the first alternative, these costs are placed in the second column together 
with the ship's costs while navigating. Under the second alternative, the 
ship's costs in the port of origin are placed in the first column and such 
costs in the port of destination are placed in the third column. 
The first alternative has the advantage of simplicity in its applica-
tion and clarity in the interpretation of the amounts in each column. In 
addition, it separates into different columns costs which are the conse-
quence of actions by different entities, and hence permits a direct iden-
tification of the economic impact of these actions. The first alternative, 
however, does not take into account the economic cost of delays to ships in 
port or of low port productivity. In this sense the second alternative, 
which assigns the cost of the ship's time while in port to the first or 
third column, provides a clearer indication of the real'relation between 
navigation costs and port costs. 
VI. PROBABLE EFFECTS OF APPLYING A COST-CENTER OCEAN LINER TARIFF 
While the effects of applying a cost-center liner tariff are somewhat 
speculative, three alternative scenarios can be imagined: (1) individual 
rates are not modified, (2) cost and productivity variations among ports 
are taken into account, and (3) the present degree of rate discrimiation 
among commodities is reduced. Furthermore, these scenarios should be view-
ed as individual stages of a continuing process through which conferences 
incorporate the cost-center approach for liner freight rates. 
:1. A cost-center ocean tariff which maintains 
unchanged all existi 	rates 
A cost-center ocean tariff which expresses existing rates as the sum 
of costs for loading in the port of origin, line-haul between ports, and 
unloading in the port of destination would provide shippers, shippers' 
councils and governments with important information which is not available 
to them at present. At the same time, it would show the true significance 
of the costs which liner vessels incur while in port. Despite the rapid 
increase in the costs of new vessels and of fuel in recent years, cargo 
handling accounts for at least 40% of the total annual cost of a typical 
cOnference'general cargo vessel. Handling costs in ports of developed 
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countries are especially high since labor productivity often fails to 
increase as rapidly as earnings of stevedores. 
Taking into account the properties of a cost-center ocean tariff 
which does not alter present freight rates, the following consequences can 
be anticipated: 
(i) Because of the availability of more detailed information, the 
bargaining position of shippers and shippers' councils in relation to the 
conferences would be strengthened. Yhen conferences propose general rate 
increases to compensate for increased costs,- they would be able to justify 
rate increases only by referring individually to the three columns. In 
turn, shippers and shippers' councils would be in a better position to veri-
fy whether handling costs or navigation costs have increased sufficiently 
to warrant the rate increases requested by the conferences. Shippers and 
shippers' councils would also be able to compare the amounts, allocated to 
each column for particular commodities by different conferences serving the 
country's trade and to question when one conference shows,_for example, a 
cargo handling cost in particular ports much higher than that shown by 
other conferences for the same ports. Shippers would also be better able 
to compare liner rates, with voyage charter rates, which are frequently 
f.i.o. The comparability of information provided by different conferences, 
and the ease with which shippers and shippers' councils could compare cost 
increases with requests for rate increases, would be greater under the 
alternative by which the end columns of the cost-center ocean tariff 
include only cargo handling costs and port dues, with all ship's costs 
placed in the center column. 
(ii) This type of cost-center ocean tariff would not identify partic-
ularly high or low cost ports, as the port costs included in the first col-
umn would represent an average cost over all ports of origin and those in 
the last column an average over all ports of destination to which the 
tariff applies. •qevertheless, the separation of average costs in loading 
ports from average costs in ports of destination would provide important 
insights into the economics of ocean transport, especially when one of the 
sets of ports encompasses a developed country or countries and the other 
set developing countries. This information, for example, would permit 
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conferences to show that only one cost component corresponds to activities 
over which shipping lines have direct responsibility and control. In ad-
dition, it would assist in analyzing the desirability for developing coun-
tries to accept new technological systems, as well as to analyze potential 
benefits from concerted action to improve port capacity and facilities. 
For this type of analysis, it would be preferable to implement the alter-
native under which the first and third columns include both cargo handling 
costs and the cost of ship's time in port. 
(iii) The conferences would Undoubtedly receive requests from ship-
pers of high-valued goods for a reduction in their freight rates. The 
consequences of acceding to these requests are analyzed in a later section. 
When conferences establish a rate for a commodity which previously was not 
specifically identified in the tariff, there would probably be a tendency 
to set a rate closer to the average of existing rates under a cost-center 
ocean tariff than is the case at present, as conferences would seek to 
avoid any claim of price discrimination among freight rates. 
(iv) The identification of a rate component which specifically relateS 
to a country's ports (even though averaged with another country's ports) 
might raise questions about the applicability of national value-added taxes 
or other types of national taxes or regulations. 
(v) For the cost-center ocean tariff to fulfill its potential as an 
information-generating mechanism, it is essential that shippers and ship-
pers' councils know the criteria that were applied in the separation of 
existing freight rates into the three component parts'. Nevertheless, much 
of the usefulness of a general application of this scheme would not be 
fully attained until different conferences adopted unified criteria regard-
ing treatment of the cost of ship's time while in port. 
(vi) The application of a cost-center ocean tariff would not affect 
conference loyalty'discounts, rebates or contract rates. 
(vii) The task of preparing, distributing and updating conference 
tariffs in a cost-center format should present no problems as existing 
freight rates are maintained unchanged. 
. A 
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2. A cost-center ocean tariff which reflects cost ----- 
variations am — ong_liorts served  
The cost-center ocean tariff can be expanded to reflect cost varia- 
tions among the ports served. This recognition of cost variations could be 
at the national level or on the basis of individual ports (or groups of 
ports) within a country. In either case the application of the cost-center 
ocean tariff would result in changes to at least some existing freight 
rates, although frequently the new rates would simply incorporate existing. 
port surcharges and hence would not significantly alter previous rates. 
A strong case can be made that for a cost-center ocean tariff which 
reflects cost variations among ports to fulfill its objective, the columns 
which correspond to cost in port should be assigned both direct cargo handl-
ing costs and the cost of ship's time while in port. Only in this way can 
total costs be compared among ports, as low direct cargo handling costs 
may be more than offset by long delays of the ship in port due to conges-
tion, inadequate facilities or low productivity. 
It might well happen that there would be no need to change the sys- 
tem of presenting rates for ranges of ports when a particular range is 
restricted to developed countries as ports of origin or destination. In 
any event, this is a question best left to the countries and conferences 
involved to decide, as in some cases national law now appears to prohibit 
any recognition in liner freight tariffs of cost variations among national 
ports.44/ For developing countries, it is most important that the cost-
center ocean tariff reflect cost variations among their ports in order to 
have a basis on which to evaluate new port investments and to assure that 
cost reductions are incorporated into freight rates. 
The probable consequences of the application of a cost-center ocean 
tariff which reflects cost variations among ports will depend to some 
degree on whether average costs are used at the national level or whether 
such tariff reflects cost variations for individual ports. These alter-
natives should be kept in mind while examining the probable consequences 
which follow: 
See, for example, United States Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 
205. 
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(i) A direct link would be established between the freight rates 
which affect a country's foreign trade and the economic efficiency of its 
ports. Cost savings resulting from one country's efforts to improve its 
ports would not be shared with other countries, while the excessive costs 
resulting from one country's inefficient ports would not be absorbed by 
other countries served by the same conference. Proposed port investments 
could be analyzed with the knowledge that the resulting benefits would 
accrue to the investing country. Consultations between governments and 
conferences on proposed port investments, changes in port operations, or 
the introduction of new maritime transport technology would become mean-
ingful because the direct consequences could be anticipated. Concerted 
efforts to improve port efficiency would almost certainly be made. 
(ii) A framework would be provided for the application of rational 
port pricing. This is an important economic tool whose usefulness is at 
present severely restricted. 
(iii) When the port efficiency of each country is reflected in that 
country's freight rates, average freight rates for at least some countries 
will rise while those for others will fall. There would thus be some 
impact on the landed price of imported goods as well as on the earnings of 
exporters although the quantitative significance of this impact should not 
be great. In those cases in Latin America where the ports of two countries 
serve the transit traffic of a third country, there could be diversion of 
traffic toward the lower-cost port. However, it should be understood that 
port dues for vessel's and costs for cargo loading and discharge do not 
constitute all the expenses which must be borne by shippers. Other ex-
penses include those for the movement of cargo betWeen the dock, storage 
area and port gate as well as the freight charges for transport between a 
port of arrival and the city of destination for landlocked countries. 
While a cost-center liner tariff would show differences in certain port 
costs, shippers would nonetheless need to determine all costs involved 
before diverting their cargo toward any port. In general, if this tariff 
only reflects differences in port efficiency among developing countries at 
the national level, it is unlikely that its application would cause sharp 
changes in the traffic of individual ports. 
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(iv) A cost-center ocean tariff which identifies the costs associated 
with a particular country's ports would permit changes in that country's 
exchange rates to be incorporated immediately and with considerable accu-
racy into the corresponding tariff. 
(v) If the cost-center ocean tariff were to reflect cost variations 
among the ports of a single country, the possibility of traffic diversion 
from one port to another could be much greater. While direct cargo handl-
ing charges might be higher in the principal ports of a developing country, 
they might well be more than offset by the higher productivity permitted 
by the concentration of mechanical aids in those ports and by the economies 
of scale related to larger absolute amounts of cargo loaded or discharged 
during each ship's call. These factors might result in lower freight 
rates to and from these principal ports with a tendency toward even greater 
concentration of economic activity within their hinterland. In other cases 
it is precisely the principal ports which presently suffer from congestion 
and to which surcharges are applied, so that a structure of freight-rates 
which takes fully into account cost variations among ports could bring 
about a diversion towards ports in outlying regions. 
(vi) The occasional use of emergency port surcharges to take into 
account temporary problems of particular ports is compatible with a cost-
center ocean tariff. If ports costs are averaged at the national level, 
the use of surcharges for individual ports may even lead to greater econom-
ic efficiency. If the tariff itself reflects cost variations among indi-
vidual ports, surcharges should be incorporated into the tariff if it is 
seen that the conditions giving rise to them are likely to persist. 
(vii) Conferences may experience greater problems in preparing a 
cost-center ocean tariff which takes into account cost variations among 
ports than one which simply breaks existing rates into three columns. It 
is likely that the initial cost-center ocean tariff would present rates 
which differ little from rates prevailing prior to its application. Over 
time, however, changes could be incorporated and such tariff would begin to 
more adequately serve its objectives. 
(viii) Shippers and shippers' councils would find more useful for 
their negotiations with conferences a cost-center ocean tariff which does 
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not present average port costs over broad port ranges. As the information 
provided in the tariff would be more specific, interested parties would be 
in a better position to verify its accuracy and to evaluate freight rate 
changes. 
(ix) There would be no important problem associated with the physical 
production, distribution and updating of a cost-center ocean tariff which 
averages port costs at the national level. If a single rate book covers 
two or more origin or destination developing countries, each of these coun-
tries would have its own first or third column. Should this prove un-
wieldy, there would be a separate tariff volume for each country served, 
which is already the case in many trades. More complicated would be the 
presentation of a tariff taking into account cost variations among the 
ports of the same country. In this case it would probably be feasible to 
present:absolute rates .for a base port or ports and to express the rates 
for the remaining ports as a percentage of these rates .4V Where a com-
modity moves only through a non-base. port, the absolute rate could be 
established for the port through which it moves. 
(x) The cost-center ocean tariff would also permit the establishment 
of rebates which could be granted by conferences when improvements have 
been made to a port's, infrastructure and, hence, productivity, in the same 
way that surcharges are applied whenever there is congestion in a port. 
3. A cost-center ocean tariff which reduces rate discrimination 
amonzcopmodities 
As has been noted, the application of a cost-center ocean tariff 
would make clearly apparent the degree of rate discrimination in liner 
conference tariffs. While the use of such a tariff would not in itself 
bring about any reduction in present discrimination among different com-
modities, shippers of high value goods, and perhaps member lines as well, 
would seek justification of freight rates for particular commodities, 
especially those which deviate the most from the "average" freight rate. 
As was shown in Section II, conferences establish freight rates to 
recover not only operating costs but also to assure a return on invested 
42/ See UNCTAD resolution 66 (III), paragraph 56 of the annex. 
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capital. Therefore, decreases in ,some rates will be compensated by in-
creases in other rates, especially when the amount of cargo which moves 
under the decreased rate is significant. Under a cost-center ocean tariff, 
it is likely that the first freight rates which would be examined as can-
didates for an increase would be those whose middle (line-haul) column is 
exceptionally low., 
For these reasons, one of the probable consequences of applying a 
cost-center ocean tariff is that discrimination among individual commod-
ities would be reduced over time. Freight rates, in other words, would 
tend to reflect the sum of real port costs plus average costs of the ship 
while at sea, and the importance of commodity value would tend to diminish 
in importance as. a factor considered in the establishment of individual 
rates. 
An analysis of the effects of a reduction in rate discrimination must 
necessarily be speculative, especially since shippers themselves might well 
appreciate the advantages -even to shippers of high-valued commodities- of 
retaining some degree of discrimination if this is necessary in order to 
maintain a satisfactory level of service. Nevertheless, in view of the 
probability that rate discrimination would decrease over time, some of the 
implications should be anticipated: 
(i) For developing countries' imports, freight rates on finished in-
dustrial products would tend to fall relative to rates on lower valued 
raw materials and intermediate goods. The present freight rate structure 
for developing countries' imports parallels to some extent the structure 
of import duties and hence reinforces the protection given to national 
industries. A reduction in rate discrimination would tend to reduce this 
protection and might also influence internal price structures: 
(ii) For developing countries' exports, a reduction in rate discrim-
ination might assist in increasing exports of industrail products while 
reducing the net income of producers of traditional raw materials. 
In evaluating the quantitative significance of the possible effects 
described above, a number of considerations should be kept in mind. 
First, a reduction in rate discrimination is unlikely to produce changes 
of importance in trading patterns, because changes in rates are not 
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expected to be large and the rates themselves are only one factor among 
many which determine these patterns. Second, any relative changes in the 
landed price of a developing countries' imports can be compensated by mar-
ginal changes in the structure of import duties. Third, there are severe 
limits on possible increases in freight rates on raw materials and other 
commodities transported in relatively large quantities because of the po-
tential competition from non-conference maritime carriers. Conferences 
value these "bottom cargoes" and will make every effort not to lose them to 
tramp ships. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The cost-center ocean tariff for liner conferences appears promising 
and potentially could receive the support of the developing countries as 
an instrument which would increase significantly the information available 
to shippers and their representatives, while at the same time reducing 
many of the disadvantages of aggregating freight rates over ranges of ports. 
It is also likely that other countries as well as liner conferences would 
find no difficulty in supporting the cost-center ocean tariff, if its use...,  
fulness is demonstrated, because its application would not change the tra-
ditional distribution of responsibility between shippers and shipping lines 
defined by liner terms. 
Nevertheless, considerable work still needs to be carried out before 
the cost-center ocean tariff can be considered formally in an appropriate 
international forum. It is hoped that this document will bring about com-
ments, criticism and suggestions from conferences, shippers, shippers' 
councils, non-conference carriers, other independent groups, and interested 
national and international organizations, which will enable CEPAL to pre-
pare a revised version for formal consideration. 
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